Appendix

D

# Document 63, John Tanner, Idaho Falls, ID Page 1 of 1

# **HLW EIS Web Comments HLWFDEIS Web Site** From: Tuesday, April 18, 2000 4:25 PM Sent: web@iason.com To: web\_archive@jason.com Cc: HLW EIS Web Comment Subject: Name: John Tanner Affiliation: Address1: 2175 Tasman Av. City, State Zip: Idaho Falls, ID 83404 Telephone: 208-529-5605 Date Entered: {ts '2000-04-18 16:25:28'} Tappreciate having had the comment period extended. Why has DOE not given serious consideration to other methods of calcining the sodium bearing waste, such as use of sugar to reduce the nitrate? I sense that we are going to lose the Calciner because of failure to develop an intelligent method of employing it. 63-2 [1] . (2) [1] agree with the National Research Council that processing of existing calcine should have a low priority.] 63-3 The DOE has biased the selection of methods by arbitrarily defining a metric ton of heavy metal as equal to two "canisters". This definition has no relation to the real limit in disposal density inside a repository, which is heat load, i.e. radioactivity. The result is to bias the economic analysis against high volume waste forms which might otherwise be desirable. One example is grouting of calcine, in case it is some day decided to treat the calcine. 63-4 111.F.2(1)

## Document 64, Margaret Macdonald Steward, Ketchum, ID Page 1 of 2



EIS PROJECT - AR PF

IDAHO HIGH-LEVEL WASTE & FACILITIES DISPOSITION DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PUBLIC COMMENT APRIL19, 2000

Thomas Wichmann, Document Manager US DOE, Idaho Operations Office 850 Energy Drive, MS 1108 Idaho Falls, ID 83401-1563

Attention: Public Comment: Idaho HLW & FD DEIS

PUBLIC COMMENT FROM: MARGARET MACDONALD STEWART PO BOX 2404 KETCHUM, 1D 83340

Having lived for nearly 30 years in Blaine County, Idaho, I am, and have been for 64-1 decades, very concerned by activities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. With alarming frequency, these activities, particularly those dealing with radioactive waste treatment and storage, are rarely based with protection of human health and the environment as the primary concern.

If we are to ever get the mess of nuclear waste and contamination at the government's 64-2 nuclear weapons and storage facilities under some sort of reasonable control, we must  $1\chi \cdot D(4)$  begin to deal with the mess in a logical and rational manner. This must be done with a concerted effort by the Department of Energy to fully engage - and listen to - its most important business partner - the public. Had this business partner been involved from the get-go, this nation would not be in the critical situation we find ourselves in today. People who live and work in the shadow of nuclear facilities have an uncanny ability to know what is going right, and what is going terribly wrong. They know when they are being lied to and they know how to best rectify a project that is terribly misguided. Enough said. Don't forget to listen to us. We have a voice and we will use it en mass to get this situation reversed to start protecting us and the world we depend on for survival.)

64-3 The Idaho HLW & FD DEIS is a complicated mass of options in how to deal with INEEL's deadly high-level waste problem. There is really no good option currently II.A (4) available to correct the damage that has been done by this waste and by the future damage it will cause. Each option presented has its own pitfalls. However, it is clear that with any reasonable thought going into the possible processes, ANY TREATMENT 64-15 METHOD CHOSEN MUST HAVE AS ITS # 1 GUIDELINE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Anything less, is completely unacceptable. 64-14

64-4 To base a treatment program on an uncertain target - a non-existent permanent geologic repository – is sheer idiocy. We have waste. We have no where to dispose of it other 111.E (1) than the site where it is right now. We must be realistic and not dwell on an over-the64-6

64-7

XI(1)

rainbow destination for nuclear waste. The AEC and DOE have been denial for decades

about the entire picture of nuclear weapons production. It is time to face the music that

what we have now we will always have and we must care for it where it is now as safely

No "separation technologies" should be considered. Separation of existing waste creates

separation; and separation technologies have not been proven safe or effective. This is 64-16 111. D.3(1)

more waste streams to manage; separation produces greater volumes of waste than non-

not the time or place for experimentation. Calcine and liquid wastes should be treated

able with the least amount of further harm done to people and the land. No matter what,

it must be scrutinized carefully, every step of the way, with full public involvement, and

the contractor must be thoroughly investigated for past and present safety and ethical

work practices - with that information made available to the public.

independently.

# Document 65, Snake River Alliance, Boise, ID Page 1 of 2



# HLW & FD

EIS PROJECT - AR PF Snake River Alliance Control # 10-65

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□ Box 4090 · Ketchum ID 83340 · 208/726-7271 · Fax 208/726-1531 · Email: mstewart@snakeriveralliance.org

□ 310 E. Center · Pocatello ID 83201 · 208/234-4782 · Fax 232-4922 · Email: srabb@earthlink.net www.snakeriveralliance.org

Comments on the

Idaho high-level waste and facilities disposition draft environmental impact statement

Snake River Alliance

April 19, 2000

he following comments and questions are submitted on behalf of the 1,300 dues-paying members of the Snake River Alliance, an Idaho-based grassroots group that has monitored activities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory since 1979.

5-[ We would like to thank the Department of Energy for extending the public comment period. In the your own words this document details "the largest, most expensive, and technically complex environmental management project at INEEL," and therefore the additional time was helpful.

The Alliance concurs with the Department's intent, as analyzed in all alternatives except "no action", to 65-2 solidify the remaining liquid waste and eventually place the calcine in a less dispersible form. However, given that there is no repository in existence to receive this waste, any assumption of such a repository should be dropped from the final EIS. Presently, the DEIS is too influenced by the assumption of a near-III.F.1(2) term High-level waste repository, and by the 1995 settlement agreement, and not enough by a fundamental need to better isolate the waste from the environment where it resides. Overall, there is too little concern for environmental protection in this DEIS.

III.D.1(1) The DEIS's limited scope makes it nearly useless as an analytical tool in terms of making the decisions it 65-5 aims to make. Probably the two most important variables in analyzing these alternatives are: (1) the question of technical risk associated with an alternative (in other words, Will it work?); and (2) the costs of the alternative. Both of these considerations are outside the scope of the DEIS. Without cost or technical viability analysis, the ROD will be baseless. Also, the EIS scopes out considering that Yucca 65-6 Mtn will not accommodate INEEL waste (because of RCRA issues). Therefore, this EIS is analyzing alternatives to come to the following conclusion: If INEEL were not bound by the realities of the current repository situation; if INEEL were not bound by the scientific realities of the physical world; and, if

INEEL had all the money in the world, this is the option we would choose.

Separations options

Clearly the "separations" alternatives analyzed in the DEIS are not in the best interest of environmental III.D.3(3) protection, and are instead driven by the current repository situation and a burning need to fulfill the terms of the settlement agreement. These alternatives, Planning Basis, Transuranics Separations and Full Separations, if they were to work, and that is a big if, might reduce the "High-level" waste volume, but in the process, the overall volume of waste would increase. In the real world this would not decrease the 65-8 overall danger of the waste. In fact, if you were to decide to leave the "low-level" waste grout fraction in the tanks, you would after spending billions of dollars, be leaving the hottest fraction and greatest nearterm threat behind. It should also be noted that the "Hanford Tank Waste Task Force" recently recommended that the DOE forgo pursuit of this technology because of the tremendous cost and technical uncertainty. In addition, the Transuranics Separations alternative involves a greater risk of a criticality accident as admitted in the document.

65-9 111.D.3(1)

ldaho MLW & FD EIS

New Information

# Document 65, Snake River Alliance, Boise, ID Page 2 of 2

### Defining High-level waste

65-10 V(9) Let's please continue to be consistent on the definition of high-level waste and not further confuse the public. The Office of Environmental Management defines high-level waste (HLW) as "highly radioactive material containing fission products, traces of uranium and plutonium, and other transuranic elements, that result from chemical processing of spent nuclear fuel." The sodium bearing waste while not as radioactive as most batches of HLW, absolutely meets the basic criteria of the definition in that it resulted from chemical processing of spent fuel and contains fission products, as well as transuranics. Therefore, the DOE's contention that this waste is not hlw is out of line.

#### Conflicting Flood Plain studies

The U.S. Geological Survey estimates the INTEC lies within the 100-year flood plain while the U.S. VIII C(5) Bureau of Reclamation estimates 500 years. Because we are dealing with some of the dangerous material known to man, we recommend that the DOE assume the more conservative USGS estimate.

65-12

The Calciner  $\overline{W}$ e request that the DOE inform the public about its decision regarding pursuit of permitting the calciner under the new MAC guidelines as soon as this decision is made, and not wait until the NEPA process is viii. N(b) under the new MAC guidelines as soon as this decision is made, and also the 1995 settlement concluded. The calciner is integral to many of the alternatives in the DEIS and also the 1995 settlement

# Document 66, U.S. EPA-Region 10 (Christian F. Gebhardt), Seattle, WA Page 1 of 1



#### UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

REGION 10 1200 Sixth Avenue Seattle, WA 98101

EIS PROJECT - AR PF

*Appendix* 

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New Information

HLW & FD Control # DC-66

APR 1 4 2000

Reply To Attn Of:

ECO-088

T.L. Wichmann, Document Manager U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office 850 Energy Drive, MS 1108 Idaho Falls, ID 83401-1563



Dear Mr. Wichmann:

Thank you for sending EPA multiple copies of the Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition EIS. We requested multiple copies to better solicit comments from reviewers in our various programs here at EPA. We have finished reviewing the document and are returning two sets of the EIS. We hope that you can redistribute the copies we are returning.

| In the future, please send us two copies of the EIS unless | (K.BC) | we request additional copies. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review this draft EIS. | 66-2 | K.A(2)

Sincerely

Christian F. Gebhardt Interim Records Manager, Geographic Implementation Unit

Printed on Recycled Paper

ldaho

HLW & FD EIS

# Document 67, Snake River Alliance (Steve Hopkins), Boise, ID Page 1 of 2

EIS PROJECT - AR PF
Control # DC-67

Name: Steve Hopkins Affiliation: Snake River Alliance Address1: PO Box 1731

Address2:

City, State Zip: Boise, ID 83702 Telephone: 208/344-9161

Date Entered: {ts '2000-04-19 19:38:26'}

Comment:

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67-8 III.D.3(1)

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